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RECENT CASE NOTES
court acted within its jurisdiction the dismissal of the writ of habeas
corpus by the district court was correct, it being available only when there
is a want of jurisdiction. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48.
R. 0. E.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC UTILITIES--PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMIssIoN-The city of Logansport has for some thirty years owned and
operated an electric light plant. Said plant was paid for originally with
funds raised by taxation, and was later enlarged and extended in part with
funds raised by taxation, and in part with surplus earnings of the plant.
The Public Service Commission of Indiana ordered a reduction of the city's
rates of charges to the public for electric current. The city brought an
action to enjoin and set aside the operation of said order on the following
grounds, as stated by the four paragraphs of the complaint:
(1) Right
to manage the plant and fix the rates to be charged is vested in the city by
virtue of its inherent power as an independent body politic or by the right
of local self-government, and such rates cannot be controlled by the Legislature or by any commission appointed by it.
(2) The law creating the
Public Service Commission of Indiana does not apply to municipally owned
public utilities, and the commission has no right thereunder to fix the rates
in question. (3) Rates fixed by the commission are inadequate and confiscatory, and are therefore unlawful and unconstitutional since they do
not provide a fair return upon the fair value of the property (that to
which a privately owned utility is entitled), but provide only sufficient
revenue to pay operating and maintenance charges. (4) Rates are insufficient because they do not yield a sum sufficient to compensate the city for
the taxes which the plant would pay if it were privately owned.
The city appealed from a judgment sustaining demurrers to the four
paragraphs of the complaint. Held, judgment reversed, with directions to
overrule the demurrer to the third paragraph only. City of Logansport v.
Public Service Commission, Supreme Court of Indiana, July 1, 1931,
177 N. E. 249.
The decision is beyond criticism. The demurrer to the first paragraph
of the complaint was correctly sustained because municipal corporations
have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative
control of the state, but are political subdivisions of the state, exercising
delegated powers. City of Tulsa v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 4 Fed.
(2d) 399, 269 U. S. 527; Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 30 L. Ed.
701; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U. S. 394, 63 L.
Ed. 1054. The action of the court on the other demurrers was obviously
correct in view of the statutes hereinafter discussed.
The decision definitely expresses the necessary result of the Public
Service Acts of Indiana. Said acts read as follows: "The term 'public
utility' as used in this act, shall mean and embrace * * * every city
or town that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control
* *
* any plant or equipment within the state * * * for the protection, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light * * * or
power * * * either directly or indirectly to or for the public." Burns'
1926, sec. 12672. Plainer language could not be used. Municipal corpora-
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tions, such as the appellant, are expressly placed under the regulation of
the Public Service Commission, and therefore subject to the obligations of
public callings on the same basis as privately owned concerns.
Some of the statutes establishing public utility commissions have expressly excluded municipally owned utilities .from the jurisdiction of said
commissions. Humphrey v. Pratt, 93 Kan. 413, 144 Pac. 197; Springfield
Gas & Electric Co. v. Springfield, 257 U. S. 66, 66 L. Ed. 131. Others, as
those of Indiana, have expressly included them. Wisconsin Traction, Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. Menasha, 157 Wis. 1, 145 N. W. 231. The purpose of
this article is to consider the efficacy of the latter action.
The argument that is invariably presented to justify such inclusion is
the theory that while a municipality is engaged in a proprietary business,
such as furnishing electricity to consumers, it is exercising not public, but
private powers, and is therefore to be treated quoad hoc as a private corporation. Learned text-writers have stated that the "division of the powers
of a municipal corporation into two classes, one public, and the other
private" is considered as being "well established." Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 110. But the above author also candidly admits that
such division is a product of "judicial legislation."
The decisions giving rise to such a theory have almost exclusively
dealt with questions as to the liability of a municipality in tort for acts
of its officials or agents. 34 Yale Law Journal 1-45, 129-143, 229-258.
Should the same theory be adhered to in determining whether a municipally
owned utility is to be subjected to public calling obligations? In Pasadena
v. Railroad Commission, 192 Pac. 25, 1 A. L. R. 1425, it was held that a
Public Utilities Act placing "Every private corporation * * * mining,
operating, managing, or controlling, any commercial * * * plant
* * * for the production, generation, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power" under the control and regulation of the
Railroad Commission did not apply to a municipal corporation so operating. The court used the following language: "It is not true that a city is
a private corporation when carrying on a municipally owned public utility.
*

*

*

No decision so holds.

*

*

*

The burden of the arguments

consist of efforts to find reasons for holding it liable to the same extent as
a private corporation engaged in the same service, notwithstanding the fact
the city carries on the business as a municipal corporation." The use
clearly shows a decided tendency against any application of the theory to
such situations.
Edwin M. Borchard, who has made a very extensive study of this
problem, makes this statement: "'The fact is that all functions performed
by a municipality are for the public benefit, otherwise they could hardly be
undertaken with public funds or by public officers." 34 Yale Law Journal, 136.
The case of Springfield Gas and Electric Co. v. Springfield (supra)
must be considered. It was therein held that "leaving free in the matter of
charges a municipality engaged in producing and selling electricity to
private consumers, while making the rates of private electric companies
subject to the approval of the state public utilities commission, does not
deny to the private corporations the equal protection of the laws." The
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true situation was that the city was charging such low rates that it was
drawing customers away from the private company, plaintiff.
Justice Holmes in the opinion used the following language, "The municipal corporation is allowed to go into business only on the theory that
thereby the public welfare will be subserved. So far as gain is an object,
it is a gain to the public body, and must be used for public ends. * * *
Whatever the value of the distinction between the private and public functions of the municipality, the duty of its governing board in this respect,
*
* * is public. * * * The plaintiff's argument * * * attempts
*
* * to overwork the delicate distinctions between the private and
public capacities of municipal corporations." (Italics added.) The italicized words seem to indicate that the Supreme Court has considerable
doubt as to the propriety of the distinction. At least the court did not
deem the situation at hand a suitable one in which to apply any such
"delicate" distinction.
The above decision has been criticized by some. The following is an
example. "The Springfield case, however, serves to check the process of
judicial evolution by which this distinction has been established. Its result
may or may not be favorable to the policy of municipal ownership. On its
face it would seem to give a strong impetus thereto, but it may be doubted
whether in complaints to the municipal authorities or in resorts to the
ballot box, the municipal residents will find any such adequate protection
from abuses in the public utility service rendered by his city as that
accorded the consumers of privately owned utilities through the administrative boards established by the public utilities acts." Overton: Regulation of Municipally Owned Public Utilities, 2 Cornell Law Quarterly 191.
Despite such expressions of doubt the fact remains that the taxpayers
eventually bear the burdens of municipal activity in event of loss or deficit.
It is reasonably to be assumed that a taxpayer would more readily consent to a necessary increase in prices of electricity consumed by him than
to a direct increase in his taxes. Why should not the city be permitted to
regulate its rates as it sees fit in view of attending conditions? The Springfield case (supra) held that "a city council has no such interest in a
municipally owned electric plant as to make it incompetent to fix the rates."
If profits are made, the public is benefitted, and taxes may consequently be
reduced. The consumers would indirectly carry the burden.
As regards the adequacy of the remedy by way of the ballot-box for
abuses in service rendered, it is hardly just to say that a public spirited
citizenry cannot maintain efficient officers in control of the municipality
who will see that relief is obtained.
The reason for regulation of private companies is the protection of
the public from the dangers of unsocial activities by them. This reason
does not apply to municipally owned plants because the public does not
need in this same way to protect itself against itself.
If the other view is adopted, as by Indiana, the fact necessarily follows
that privately owned utilities will be well pleased, and will rest assured
that municipally owned concerns are subject to the same public calling
obligations as imposed upon them. The Acts are in this regard aligned
upon the side of the private owner of public utilities. Of the two results,
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the former would seem more desirable, and more in keeping with the true
concepts of municipal powers. The decision of the case in question is
correct, but the Public Service Commission Act is wrong in this respect,
*P.J. D.
and should be amended.
SALES-PASSING

OF TITLF-APPROPRIATION OF GooDs By VENDR-

Thompson-Weber Co. contracted to pack and sell F. O B. sellers' place
1,000 cases of tomatoes for Jos. A. Goddard Co. during the canning season
of 1927. Credits which Jos. A. Goddard had with Thompson-Weber Co.
were to be applied as payment in part. On Oct. 15, Thompson-Weber Co.
had packed 950 cases, put Goddard's label on them, and set them aside in
a separate pile. He notified Goddard of this act and also stated that he would
ship the next day, which was the 16th of October. On Oct. 16 one Craig
Brokerage Co. offered to buy and had Thompson-Weber ship the 950 cases
to them under a bill of lading. Craig Brokerage Co. accepted the draft
sent them knowing that the goods bore Goddard's labels, and then took
possession of the goods. This action is by Jos. Goddard Co. in replevin v.
Craig Brokerage Co. Held-The terms "F. 0. B. sellers place" in the contract relate only to price and not to time title passes. By appropriation
or setting aside, the title to the 950 cases passed to the buyer and the subsequent sale to the appellant gave him no title to the tomatoes. Craig
Brokerage Co. v. Jos. A. Goddard Co., 175 N. E. 19 (Ind.App. 1931).
Title is accompanied with several incidents which are of considerable
importance in the law of sales. The most important incident is the risk
of accidental loss or damage. In a sale the law presumes, unless a contrary intention of the parties appears, that the risk was intended to follow
title as an incident to it. Williston on Sales, Ed. 2, Sec. 302, Jessup v.
Fairbanks, 38 Ind. App. 673, 78 N. S. 1050. As a matter of illustration,
when the title remains in the seller, for other than security purposes, the
risk of accidental losses or damage is on the seller; and, likewise, when
title passes by virtue of the sale to the buyer, he must bear the risk, Foley
v. Felrath, 98 Ala. 176, 13 So. 485; Strauss Saddle Co. V. Kingman, 42
Mo. App. 208; Allyn v. Buor, 37 Ind. App. 223, 76 N. E. 636. The right to
sell is another very important incident of title and it is the only one involved in the instant case. It necessarily follows that one who has title
to goods may by sale transfer title'to a buyer; but, as a general rule, after
title has passed to the buyer the seller may no longer transfer title to a
third party. Incidentally, there is a well recognized exception to the rule.
If retention of possession by the seller is found, as a question of fact for
the jury, to be fraudulent as against creditors and bona fide purchasers,
a third party who relies upon the fraudulent possession of the seller in
purchase of the goods will prevail in title as against the buyer who allowed
the possession to remain in the seller. Burns, 1926, 8050. See Rose v.
Colter, 76 Ind. 590; Hardy v. Mitchel, 67 Ind. 485; Noble v. Hines, 72 Ind.
12; Spaulding v. Blythe, 72 Ind. 93; Powell v. Stickney, 88 Ind. 310; Rinn
v. Rhodes, 93 Ind. 389. Also, Seavy v. Walker, 108 Ind. 87, 9 N. E. 347;
Higgins v. Sparr, 145 Ind. 167, 43 N. E. 11. Williston on Sales, Ed. 2,
See. 311. Also as an incident of title there must be added the right of
creditors to possess themselves of the goods to which their debtor has title.

